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Introduction
On June 7, 1981, on the order of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Israel 
Defence Forces (IDF) jets bombed the Osirak nuclear installation at 
Tuwaitha, outside of Baghdad. The attack destroyed the complex, 
comprising a French-built Osiris-type Materials Testing Reactor (MTR), 
as well as a smaller adjacent reactor. The two reactors were known in Iraq 
as Tammuz-I and Tammuz-II. The Israeli jets returned to their bases 
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unscathed, and Iraq, which was in the midst of a war with Iran (which had 
the year before bombed but not destroyed the site), did not retaliate 
militarily.
Analyzing the bombing of Osirak one year later, Israeli political scientist 
Shai Feldman was ambivalent: "It is exceedingly difficult to weigh the var-
ious short- and long-term gains and costs associated with the Baghdad 
operation. The element of speculation is predominant, since many of the 
considerations involved are in the realm of the intangible."1 Feldman's 
article remains one of the best on the subject, and many of the consider-
ations involved remain in the realm of the intangible. To assess the effi-
cacy of Israel's strike on Osirak, one must determine Israel's strategic 
objectives and their material effects on Iraqi capabilities. The capacity of 
the facilities to produce fissionable material without detection remains in 
dispute. So, too, does the timeline—and therefore the imminence—of 
Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear option. Moreover, the implications of Oper-
ation Opera are hard to measure.2 
Borrowing from Dan Reiter's framework,3 the three central areas of 
assessment are the following: 1) the plutonium production capacity of 
Iraq's facilities over time (and Iraqi intentions to make a bomb); 2) the 
likelihood of detection and subsequent interdiction; and 3) the effect of 
the destruction of the reactor on the subsequent course of the Iraqi 
nuclear program. A fourth element is also crucial: the broader political 
implications of pre-emptive military action as a component of Israeli 
nuclear security doctrine.
The political cost-benefit equation in this case requires a fair dose of 
subjective judgment. How much did the Israelis delay the program? How 
much did Iraqi motivation increase post facto? Is military counter-
proliferation a viable strategy? Was the potential Iraqi bomb worth 
risking a bold, unprovoked attack that inevitably drew the condemnation 
of the world? Did the raid, in toto, raise or lower the risk of regional 
proliferation in the Middle East? All of these considerations must factor 
into an informed opinion on the retrospective wisdom of Begin's decision.
What is clear is that Israel chose to attack Osirak at a moment of per-
ceived strategic advantage, not because Iraq was on the verge of possess-
ing enough fissile material to construct an atomic weapon. Israeli 
decision-makers traded one set of risks—the immediate and unpredict-
able effects of a preemptive strike—to thwart or possibly eliminate a 
longer-term strategic shift, the rise of a nuclear-armed adversary. The 
merits of the strike were in dispute in 1981, and remain so nearly thirty 
years later, in significant part because they stem from political decisions 
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grounded in imperfect and fallible intelligence, and on individuals' sub-
jective interpretation of the known facts. In hindsight, Israel enjoyed a 
significant reprieve from a nuclear Iraq and suffered few of the potential 
repercussions to its bold action. Yet this may owe as much to luck as to 
foresight, and the Israeli security establishment has never resolved for 
itself exactly what type of precedent Osirak represents.
While there is no scholarly consensus on the relative success or failure of 
the Israeli operation, it was certainly a tactical masterpiece and a strategic 
enigma.
Intentions and Capabilities
Very few experts would claim today that Iraq under Saddam Hussein in 
1981 was anything but intent on building a deliverable nuclear bomb. One 
1983 account by a prominent Harvard physicist, on the other hand, 
accepted credulously the Iraqi claim that Osirak was intended for peaceful 
research. The physicist, Richard Wilson, visited the destroyed Tuwaitha 
facilities, but he had admittedly little background in nuclear weapons and 
proliferation, and he was apparently misled by Iraqi authorities on his 
tour.4 The scholarly consensus has since discredited this view.5 
Iraq first wanted to buy a large gas-graphite reactor from France, which 
could produce plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon. Only when the 
French rejected this request did Iraq, in 1976, purchase their Osiris-type 
light-water MTR.6 This was a strange decision for a country without an 
existing nuclear power program, as MTRs are used for research purposes 
to complement large power reactors. The switch made it appear that Iraq 
was desperate to find a route, however circuitous, to the bomb.7 
Later reports by top Iraqi nuclear scientists largely bore out this interpre-
tation. Mahdi Obeidi, a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear scientist, asserted that 
he was told in a private meeting with a superior that Hussein wanted the 
bomb, and he inferred that this was the purpose of Osirak.8 Khidhir 
Hamza, another scientific defector, wrote in a joint 1998 piece with David 
Albright, "The Iraqis believed that the safeguards on the [Osirak] reactor, 
which would have included periodic inspections and surveillance cam-
eras, could have been defeated."9 He later amended his story, arguing that 
the Osirak plant was a "decoy" whose design Iraqi scientists would "copy" 
for the building of another "secret reactor."10 Unfortunately, scholars lack 
good sources on Iraqi decision-making, and it is therefore impossible to 
discern which drivers motivated the Iraqi push for a nuclear weapons 
capability.
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There were two possible ways that Osirak could contribute to the Iraqi 
quest for fissionable material: uranium diversion or plutonium separa-
tion. The reactor ran on highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel (approxi-
mately 93 percent uranium 235), which was already of a weapons-grade 
purity, and the Iraqis may have hoped to utilize it to construct a weapon. 
The risk of HEU fuel diversion was not a major concern, as the French 
required the Iraqis to account fully for each quarterly shipment of spent 
fuel before they would release the next fuel shipment. And each twelve 
kilogram (kg) shipment would not provide the critical mass of uranium 
necessary to set off a nuclear explosion in a bomb.11 The possibility that 
the reactor's normal operations could mask a hidden plutonium produc-
tion program, on the other hand, greatly worried the Israelis.
Israel claimed that excess neutron flux in the reactor could have been 
leveraged to irradiate natural uranium targets to produce plutonium.12 
Natural uranium targets could not be configured directly into a weapon. 
However, Israel claimed that natural uranium targets posed a plutonium 
production threat, and undeclared natural uranium targets, unlike 
French-supplied HEU fuel rods, would not be subject to International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. This scenario was their pri-
mary concern about Osirak.
Iraq had in fact purchased hundreds of tons of natural uranium from Bra-
zil and other sources.13 An Italian company sold the Iraqis a fuel fabrica-
tion laboratory that could serve to fashion natural uranium targets, as 
well as hot cells that could be used for small-scale plutonium separation 
experiments. There was also a larger facility that the Israelis claimed 
could be used for large-scale plutonium processing if properly modified 
with radiation shielding.14 Estimates vary as to how much plutonium 
Osirak could produce, and how quickly, but it appears probable that 
within a few years' time, the Iraqis—if not detected and stopped—could 
accumulate enough plutonium for at least a couple of bombs.
The total quantity of plutonium that Osirak could have produced 
depended on the power of the reactor (Israel believed that it could be 
expanded from 40 to 70 MW); the capacity of the cooling system; the 
amount of natural uranium that could be irradiated by the neutron flux 
aimed at the fuel in the core; and the arrangement of the targets.
Iraq's plutonium separation capacity was shrouded in mystery. Richard 
Betts even concluded that the Iraqis lacked a separation capability at the 
time of the strike. He argued that "the reprocessing plant, rather than the 
reactor, would have been the appropriate target," for without separation 
facilities the radioactive material would have been useless.15 Israel 
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believed that facilities at the Osirak complex—which were destroyed in 
the air strike—could be converted for active plutonium separation work. 
Because the Israeli leadership worried that Iraq could obtain this capabil-
ity swiftly, on or off-site from the reactor itself, they preferred that Osirak 
be destroyed before spent uranium was stockpiled for plutonium separa-
tion and weapons use.
Israel had good reason to believe that, sooner or later, Iraq was going to 
obtain multiple bombs' worth of plutonium, barring discovery. One might 
question the possibly premature timing of the raid,16 as figures in the 
Israeli cabinet and opposition did. But Israeli decision-makers were 
unanimous in the view that the Osirak project, if left undisturbed, would 
eventually produce an Iraqi bomb. The more interesting and confusing 
half of the equation lies in the field of inspections and detection. This 
question has also generated some of the most vitriolic and impassioned 
polemics of the Osirak affair.
Inspections and Timing
Operation Opera was perceived as a "vote of no confidence" in the global 
nonproliferation regime, which comprised the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA inspections system. Israel posited the utter 
inadequacy of existing safeguards. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the 
safeguards system was never put to the test. The terms of Iraq's agree-
ment with France mandated IAEA inspections of the site every few 
months. Inspections were intended to account for the HEU fuel and 
related activities. For this reason, Israel worried that the natural uranium 
targets, produced from yellowcake freely and legally purchased on inter-
national markets, would be outside the purview of the IAEA's inspectors. 
The IAEA had the right to request additional inspections of other areas, 
but all such visits needed to be approved by the Iraqi hosts. Round-the-
clock video-camera monitoring was to provide an additional layer of secu-
rity, but an agreement had yet to be reached on the cameras by the time of 
the Israeli attack.
A verdict on the efficacy of the attack hinges in large part on the likelihood 
that the irradiation of natural uranium targets would have come to light. 
The Israelis feared that this was unlikely, while the IAEA claimed that 
such concerns were far-fetched. Iraq would have to remove the natural 
uranium before each inspection and then replace it as soon as IAEA 
inspectors left. This complex physical task would have to evade video 
cameras and the hundreds of foreign technicians on site. Even if the Iraqis 
managed to spirit away the irradiated targets and secretly process it, there 
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was one other crucial indicator that could tip off foreign observers. Use of 
the neutron flux to irradiate natural uranium in addition to the HEU fuel 
would noticeably lower the efficiency of the reactor, resulting in an ele-
vated consumption of French fuel. Outside observers would be sure to 
notice this, the IAEA and French argued, which would accordingly impel 
the French to cut off fuel shipments, thereby ceasing reactor operations.17 
The Israeli Government, as Shai Feldman points out, neither trusted in 
the ability of the IAEA to detect clandestine activity nor in the will of the 
international community to do something about it were such activities to 
be uncovered. The Israelis chose to nip the problem in the bud, although 
the cabinet decision was a close one, with major figures such as Yigael 
Yadin and Yehoshua Saguy voting against.18 Shimon Peres, in a private 
letter to Begin that was leaked to the press, argued that there was still 
time for inspections to have a positive influence. Equally important in his 
mind was the election of François Mitterand to the French presidency. 
Peres believed that Mitterand was both friendlier to Israel and more con-
cerned with nuclear proliferation than his predecessor, Giscard d'Estaing. 
Therefore, Peres argued that Israel should wait to see if the French would 
cut off the fuel supply if Iraq was caught seeking plutonium.19 
Begin may have had a number of reasons for deciding to strike precisely 
when he did, not least of which could have been his sincere fear of spread-
ing radiation once the reactor was operational. The Israeli Government 
justified the timing based on intelligence reporting that Osirak was soon 
to receive its first shipment of fuel and commence operations. According 
to Begin, once active, the reactor's destruction would have spread radia-
tion fallout throughout Baghdad.20 Many sources, including the Congres-
sional Research Service and Brookhaven Laboratory, have since rebutted 
this claim.21 Further scientific study on this matter would help clarify one 
of the key points in the Osirak debate.
Surely Israel's frustrations in raising the diplomatic profile of the issue, 
which dated back to the late 1970s under Prime Minister Rabin, contrib-
uted to pessimism regarding the diplomatic efforts to halt Iraq's nuclear 
ambitions. Nonetheless, the attack was not made with Israel's back 
against the wall, at the eleventh hour. It is more accurate to say that 
Israeli decision-makers chose the strategic time and opportunity that they 
believed ideal, for reasons that have yet to be fully clarified. The American 
nuclear scientist Albert Carnesale, in his testimony at the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee hearings on the strike, best encapsulated the strate-
gic calculus. It is most likely that inspectors would have warned of any 
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plutonium production, he said, but the Israelis were not willing to live 
with the odds that Saddam might get the bomb. Whether that justified the 
attack, he went on, depends on how one calculates the odds.22 
Quantifying the Delay
Iraq irrevocably lost the plutonium option when the Osirak reactor was 
destroyed, as it was subsequently unable to reach a deal with France or 
another foreign supplier to build a new reactor. Soon after the attack, Sad-
dam Hussein initiated an ambitious and covert uranium enrichment pro-
gram. The budget and personnel for uranium enrichment were several 
times the scale of the Osirak effort, indicating a redoubled Iraqi commit-
ment to the bomb. The public humiliation of the bombing, in which Iraqi 
defense forces were inert and helpless as Israel destroyed the country's 
prized technological showpiece, no doubt increased national will and 
motivation, at least among the leadership. Hussein and other Arab lead-
ers issued several statements on the intolerability of Zionist monopoliza-
tion of nuclear technology, indicating a clear increase in the political 
salience of the issue. Yet in 2010, remarkably, Israel still maintains its 
regional nuclear monopoly, and no Arab state possesses an advanced 
nuclear program.23 
How much time did Begin really buy? Jeremy Tamsett and Richard Betts 
made opposing arguments on this score, and the truth lies somewhere in 
between. Tamsett argued that the delay was significant, as subsequent 
Iraqi efforts entailed countless funds and man-hours poured into futile 
endeavors. The uranium enrichment route was technically more difficult 
and involved parallel efforts (electro-magnetic isotope separation, gas-
eous diffusion, and finally gas centrifuges);24 Iraq never mastered the 
technology. Additionally, much of the budget was dedicated toward pre-
serving secrecy and dispersion, which presented severe logistical chal-
lenges that sapped the program's efficiency.25 
By contrast, Betts argued that the secret uranium effort likely brought 
Iraq closer to a bomb than the more visible plutonium program ever 
would have. He was somewhat sanguine about the prospects of detection 
at Osirak, and he therefore believes that the Israeli strike was counterpro-
ductive, in effect pushing the Iraqis toward a more discreet, harder-to-
monitor uranium-based bomb program. Despite increased international 
attention to Iraqi proliferation, and the refusal of European countries to 
cooperate with the Iraqi program following Operation Opera (arguments 
utilized by Tamsett), Betts pointed out that Iraq was still able to procure 
centrifuge components on the European and international markets (and 
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with the help of the A.Q. Khan network). Had the Gulf War taken place in 
1993, Betts wrote, Saddam "might have [had] a nuclear weapon in his hol-
ster."26 Betts's conclusion: "It is hard to determine in fact whether the 
strike against Osirak retarded Iraq's nuclear weapons program or spurred 
it."27 
If one accepts the Israeli Government estimate of Osirak's yielding a 
bomb by 1985, then Israel bought many years, since Iraq did not possess 
atomic weapons in 1991. If one accepts Betts's argument, then Iraq may 
have been pushed from a slow, easy-to-monitor program into a more dan-
gerous, stealth approach. Most likely, Israel achieved a delay of several 
years at the cost of pushing Iraq into a more covert program.
In 1991, following the American ouster of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, then-
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney sent David Ivry, who headed Operation 
Opera as an Air Force General, a photograph of the destroyed Osirak reac-
tor, with a note of appreciation for denying Saddam a nuclear bomb and 
making the Americans' job one decade later easier. The timing of the Gulf 
War before the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission perfected its centrifuge 
designs was serendipitous. Had Iraq not invaded Kuwait in 1990, Iraq 
may very well have learned to enrich bomb-grade uranium out of sight of 
foreign intelligence agencies and international supervision. The effect of 
Operation Opera was one of delay—precisely how many years it is difficult 
to say—but not of insuperable impediment. So too the regional and global 
political repercussions of the raid were complex and even contradictory.
Political Implications
An international uproar ensued after Israel accepted responsibility for the 
destruction of Osirak, with not just Arab and Muslim states but also the 
Europeans and even the United States strongly condemning the bombing. 
Arab representatives attempted to have Israel removed from the IAEA, 
but U.S. opposition blocked the move. The UN Security Council passed a 
strongly worded condemnation, yet the U.S. was able to convince Iraq to 
support a Chapter VI resolution (which does not carry Security Council 
sanctions) in order to avoid a U.S. veto. Perhaps more importantly, the 
bombing came in the midst of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, only 
days after Sadat met with Begin, and during a delicate time leading up to 
the handover of the Sinai Desert. Israel soon exacerbated Arab antipathy 
by bombing, with civilian casualties, an apartment building in Beirut that 
served as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters. The fol-
lowing year, 1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in 
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response to PLO terrorist attacks on Israeli towns. The Begin era gave 
Israel a belligerent, aggressive image, with Osirak merely one in a series of 
military activities.
Interestingly, the bombing of Osirak increased the political "salience" of 
nuclear weapons in the Middle East without launching a regional arms 
race. None of Israel's Arab neighbors (neither Turkey nor Iran) moved in 
the aftermath of the bombing to aggressively pursue the nuclear option. It 
is possible that Israel achieved the desired deterrent effect, although that 
supposition is belied by Iraq's determination to reconstitute its program 
in secret. It is also possible that other Middle Eastern states did not see 
the Israeli bomb as a threat to their security, and that Israel's posture of 
ambiguity effectively communicated the intention never to brandish the 
weapon, except to stave off the elimination of the state. It is also possible 
that Israel's bombing did in fact motivate its neighbors to get the bomb, 
but that they were simply unable to do so for financial, scientific, or other 
reasons. More research on the programs of neighboring states, and their 
reaction to Operation Opera, is needed.28 
The attack did bring international attention to Israel's possession of 
nuclear arms and its refusal to sign the NPT or submit its facilities to 
IAEA inspections, but Israel was never compelled to submit. The United 
States gave Israel a slap on the wrist when it temporarily suspended a 
shipment of planes, but it never found Israel in formal violation of their 
arms agreement (which stipulated that American-made F-15 and F-16 
fighter aircraft were to be used for defensive purposes only). The main 
political effects of Osirak, then, were increased diplomatic isolation, tem-
porary tensions with the United States, and the addition of fuel to the fire 
of Arab animosity. Iraq was unable to retaliate militarily, its conventional 
army fully engaged on the Iranian front and its asymmetrical or uncon-
ventional capabilities at that time nonexistent.
A "Begin Doctrine"?
Did the Begin government act on the assumption that it would be possible 
indefinitely to deny nuclear weapons to Israel's enemies? Or did he pre-
sume more modestly that he could simply put off the inevitable? The two 
premises would recommend sharply different strategic thinking. If mili-
tary strikes are the final word in counter-proliferation, then the Israeli 
Government may have thought it established a model for future, repeated 
strikes on other countries, or again in Iraq. Yet if Begin accepted that one 
day an enemy state would eventually get the bomb, then he could have 
hoped only to buy time, with starkly different implications for strategy.
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When the Israeli Government announced the Osirak raid, it declared: 
"Under no circumstances would we allow the enemy to develop weapons 
of mass destruction against our nation; we will defend Israel's citizens, in 
time, with all the means at our disposal." Later in the year, then-Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon had this to say:
"The third element in our defense policy for the 1980s is our 
determination to prevent confrontation states from gaining 
access to nuclear weapons. Israel cannot afford the introduction 
of the nuclear weapon. For us it is not a question of a balance of 
terror but a question of survival. We shall therefore have to pre-
vent such a threat at its inception."29 
Sharon and Begin, at least in declaratory policy, seemed to believe that a 
system of stable deterrence was impossible and the advent of an Arab 
Bomb not merely dangerous but apocalyptic (Begin supposedly saw a 
bomb in Saddam's hands as a sure replay of the Holocaust). On the other 
hand, their policy could be interpreted to apply only to "enemy" or "con-
frontation" states, meaning they would not react similarly to nucleariza-
tion of a country that recognized and made peace with the Jewish State.
The Labor opposition under Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, on the 
other hand, took a more nuanced view. Here is Rabin in a 1981 interview:
"Israel must do everything to prevent an Arab state [from] reach-
ing a serious potential for building a nuclear bomb or acquiring 
one. Israel must first exhaust all diplomatic means and covert 
operations. Yet, if these measures fail, I do not preclude Israeli 
direct military action designed to obstruct or delay the realization 
of a nuclear option (its elimination once and for all is impossible), 
particularly in a country whose leaders are of the Saddam Hus-
sein or Muammar Qaddafi kind."30 
Rabin saw the Osirak strike, and the American attack on Iraq's nuclear 
infrastructure in the Gulf War, as creating a window of opportunity to fur-
ther improve Israel's conventional advantage and, ultimately, to achieve a 
regional settlement via peace negotiations. He became increasingly con-
cerned with Iran and its nuclear program in the 1990s, and hoped to con-
clude talks with the Palestinians before Iran went nuclear (this was one of 
many considerations that led him to endorse the Oslo process). Internal 
Israeli Government deliberations in 1981 will be declassified in the com-
ing years. Those documents should do much to illuminate Israeli strategic 
thinking at this juncture.
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Then there is the matter of precedent setting. Many observers at the time 
of Operation Opera worried that the Israeli decision would set off a wave 
of preemptive strikes on nuclear installations, with the most dangerous 
venue being the Indo-Pakistani arena. Arab states might attempt to take 
out the Dimona reactor in retaliation. As Commonweal wrote in a bril-
liant editorial some months after the attack,31 the Israeli operation had 
grave consequences for the international community, but this was in large 
measure a result of the inadequacies of the international nonproliferation 
regime. They could understand why Israel would value its national secu-
rity over considerations of global stability, and in closing hoped that the 
attack would create pressure to improve IAEA safeguards and clamp 
down on commercial sales of nuclear technology. This to some extent 
happened. IAEA inspectors today have stronger tools to demand com-
plete access. Sales in nuclear technology have declined, especially with the 
breakup of the A.Q. Khan network. And yet it is still possible, as North 
Korea and Iran have shown (Iran is only midway through the sequence), 
for determined states to avoid or refuse inspections, clandestinely 
advance their capabilities, and then pull out of the NPT at the time of their 
choosing. This unpleasant fact raises questions about the long-term via-
bility of the current regime of haves and have-nots.
Osirak Redux
And that set the other precedent—the urge, in the words of a 2007 article, 
to pull off an "Osirak Redux" on a larger scale, this time at Natanz, Esfa-
han, and Bushehr.32 The writers argue that Israel most likely possesses 
the necessary ordnance (BLU bunker busters) and intelligence to disrupt 
the Iranian nuclear program severely and set it back several years. In 
short, while the Iranians learned the lesson of Osirak and dispersed, hid, 
and hardened their nuclear facilities, the Israelis have not been sitting 
still. Their air force, in the author's assessment, has kept pace. They have 
made a military, and not a strategic, analysis. More recently, Anthony 
Cordesman's study reached the opposite conclusion.33 Yet any attempt to 
set back the Iranian program, even if successful, is fraught with political 
and strategic hazards. It is likely that Iran could reconstitute more quickly 
than Iraq did because its nuclear technology, and the program's knowl-
edge base, is more heavily indigenous. There would be any number of 
unpredictable political consequences, both internal to Iran (the strike 
would likely strengthen the current regime, and the hard-line elements 
within it) and international (global Muslim anger at Israel and the West). 
Iran also has the capability to respond to Israel directly, with long-range 
Shahab missiles, and indirectly, with shorter-range missiles via its 
Hezbollah proxy.
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Can Israel live with an enemy bomb? Does it have a choice? The legacy of 
Osirak is a tactical success and a strategic riddle. There are no easy 
answers, quick fixes, or models for general replication.
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